Obama Invokes Keynes and FDR, and Promises a Return to Central Planning

(Cross-posted at Heritage)

While he spoke about moving forward, and promised change as we look toward the future, in fact President Obama’s inaugural address was firmly entrenched in discredited policies of the past; policies that never worked.

For example:

Now, there are some who question the scale of our ambitions — who suggest that our system cannot tolerate too many big plans. Their memories are short. For they have forgotten what this country has already done; what free men and women can achieve when imagination is joined to common purpose, and necessity to courage.

His words here are very reminiscent of Roosevelt’s words at the start of the Great Depression. But, our memories are indeed short, if we forget that Roosevelt’s plans were actually huge failures.

Next, Obama invokes J. M. Keynes to support his call to planning, once again invoking a discredited idea from the past:

What the cynics fail to understand is that the ground has shifted beneath them — that the stale political arguments that have consumed us for so long no longer apply. The question we ask today is not whether our government is too big or too small, but whether it works — whether it helps families find jobs at a decent wage, care they can afford, a retirement that is dignified.

Keynes argued that the inefficiency of government spending compared with private spending did not apply during periods of recession. He reasoned that when the economy was not at full-employment (i.e. during a recession) government was “better than nothing.” Government could inject the economy with money, by borrowing and spending it, and put the unemployed to work.

Of course, even if borrowing is helpful during these periods, it could still be spent privately (with tax cuts). So, Keynes had to argue that tax cuts are too slow, and that people saving the money, as they might do when given a tax cut, is not as good as government spending the money. However, Keynesian theories have not been supported by reality, and his proofs have long ago been abandoned by economists. Yet, Obama is embracing this new trend toward the past.

Finally, Obama promises that the programs that work will remain and those that fail will be discontinued: “Where the answer is yes, we intend to move forward. Where the answer is no, programs will end.”

Supposedly, this is a major difference from the past – when, apparently, government cared less about whether the programs were working. Of course, it is rare that a government program is ever ended. As Reagan put it, “There is nothing more permanent than a temporary government program.” It is also impossible to know whether a program is “stimulating the economy.” Those that benefit from them can make this known to all, but those that suffer cannot know or prove that it is the program that makes them suffer: the damage is indirect because it caused by high taxes, the crowd-out of private business, and so on. So, a true cost-benefit analysis of any given program is impossible.

Obama has promised nothing more than a return to the 1930s; to the old discredited economic theories and the old discredited policies of central planning.

A Taste of the Control Inherent in Planning

Hayek said "Economic control is not merely control of a sector of human life which can be separated from the rest; it is the control of the means for all our ends."

This is very true, and key to understanding why the experiments with socialism have inevitably led to totalitarian dictatorships. It is also critical to remember when we little by little feed government power, the power to control our economic lives, and hence our lives in toto.

A fascinating reminder of what economic control truly means comes from the excellent - truly golden - book The Soviet Economic System: A Legal Analysis. Especially those of you who enjoy law and economics both, and "libertarian theory" on Leviathan and freedom, should check it out.

So, here Ioffe and Maggs here are discussing ownership in the Soviet Union, and describing the rights of the state firms, who possess "operative administration" rights, but are not owners. The state is the legal owner, and they investigate whether it can also be considered the de facto owner. They also consider what it means that "the state" is the owner -- of course, it turns out to mean that the Politburo and Secretary are the real owners. In any case, here they are describing the actual rights of the firm. It turns out that some of the restrictions on "possession, use and disposition" which apply to those holding only "operative administration" include strict limitations to use the property for planned purposes only and not to "sell postcards if you are a pharmacy," and that all money must reside in "funds" to be used for specific activities - investment, purchases, wages, depreciation, etc. The state bank which holds the funds ensures that the seller and buyer in any exchange both have the appropriate rights and use the appropriate funds, etc. And then here is the golden paragraph:

An examination of the legal provisions established for goods produced, goods which are the result of production rather than a fund for production, is useful for a full comprehension of the operative administration exercised by a producing entity. In this case, the rightholder has the rights of possession and disposition, but not the right of use. To use its own product, the economic entity must transfer the requisite portion of it from goods produced to production or other funds. If the goods produced are subject to planned distribution, then, in order to acquire its own product, the producer must be included in the plan of distribution issued by the planning agencies. Violations of this rule lead to legal sanctions. If the goods produced are excluded from planned distribution, then, in order to acquire its own product, the producer must have adequate resources in a monetary fund that may be employed for such an acquisition, and when part of the entity's product becomes a part of its fund of physical goods, the price of the product thus obtained must be deducted from the appropriate monetary fund and added to the amount of gain resulting from the sale of the product.

Yes. If you want to use some of the paper that your paper factory makes, you must be part of the planned distribution. Even if the distribution of paper is not being planned out - miraculously - this year, then you must sell the paper to yourself within the guidelines of the use of your monetary funds and adjust your balance sheet to reflect that you fulfilled output and simply sold to yourself some amount of the paper, which you were able to pay for out of your budget for purchases.

Now, I suppose that many firms do this kind of accounting anyway - to ensure that they are not being wasteful. However, the key thing to note here is who is in charge of all of this: the state. And "violations are subject to legal sanctions." This is entirely another kind of "accounting" when this is taken to heart.

The Real Danger of World Government

(Cross-posted at Heritage)

Even more than rent-seeking and government expansion here at home, the greatest danger of a left-leaning Obama administration may be the danger of capitulation to a new world government.

In the past, “One World Government” has been seen as a rallying cry of a fringe group, not something that many in the mainstream would either fear or desire. But, suddenly today it is on the lips of world leaders. The recent financial crisis is being blamed on a lack of world government.

The Financial Times reports:

Jacques Attali, an adviser to President Nicolas Sarkozy of France, argues that: “Global governance is just a euphemism for global government.” As far as he is concerned, some form of global government cannot come too soon. Mr Attali believes that the “core of the international financial crisis is that we have global financial markets and no global rule of law”.

But, the financial crisis was not caused by a lack of international regulation. Financial crises in the past have tended to occur more due to intervention than due to lack of regulation, and each of the banks that failed in this crisis was regulated by at least one country. Monetary policy was a major cause of the 1929 stock market crash and is implicated in just about every other crash.

In addition to dangerous monetary policy, one of the underlying causes of the Asian financial crisis of the late 1990s was government industrial policy, “As part of their industrial policy, governments have directed funds toward favored industries at low rates of interest… This leads to excess lending to the companies that are well-connected and who may have bought influence with government officials.”

This is the same kind of corruption and rent-seeking we’ve been seeing back here at home, with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and in other areas of government. Extensive government reach into markets is what causes crashes and recessions – not a lack of even more expansive government reach.

These leaders want not only to abandon capitalism as we know it, but they want to force these ideas upon all countries by regulating companies at the international level. This kind of anti-market world governance would not make peace more likely, nor would it make free trade more possible or financial crises less frequent.

Stiglitz on Socialism

I'm flipping through Stiglitz's Whither Socialism, which I've not read before, and finding many interesting thoughts to chew on.

Many of these are of course old news by 1989 when he wrote this, (but not conceded by all economists!), and some are not correct but still interesting. He seems to be a thought provoking guy with some very insightful arguments and connections. He also packs a lot into a short space, and keeps it very readable.

1. Futures Markets: the perfect competition model, which Stiglitz admits is too flawed to inform the choice between markets and socialism, assumes a complete set of markets including the ability for markets to allocate investment efficiently.

But investment into the future requires futures markets, which many sectors don't have. "These futures markets are essential for making the correct investments allocations." He goes on to argue that they must extend infinitely -- of course this would only be in order to be as efficient as a planner with complete and perfect knowledge, so it seems to be a weak argument. p. 16

2. On Austrian methodology:

My concerns are two-fold: First, because Hayek (and his followers) failed to develop formal models of the market process, it is not possible to assess claims concerning the efficiency of that process, and second (and relatedly), in the absence of such modeling, it is not possible to address the central issue of concern here, the mix and design of public and private activities, including alternative forms of regulations (alternative "rules of the game" that the government might establish) and the advantages of alternative policies toward decentralization-centralization.

p. 25

3. Stiglitz does as well as Hayek showing the paradox of perfect competition assumptions, such as complete markets and perfect information (or "informed" markets), see e.g. p. 38

4. Stiglitz points to the incentive/calculation problem of using targets which specify output not according to profit, but according to a single measurement that so plagued socialist economies, calling it the problem of not fully specifying commodity prices. p. 85

He points to this later as a way in which planning failed in precisely the way that the neoclassical model failed, when he invokes the planners inability to specify commodities as creating "an incomplete set of markets" and concludes that it is "one of the reasons that the neoclassical model fails" and "Exactly the same set of factors are at work in explaining why socialism fails." p. 198-99

5. The theory of contests as a replacement for perfect competition-- isn't this very similar to the Austrian concept of competition as a driving force (Kirzner) or a market process (Mises)? Although he finds some areas in which he believes competition can be destructive, he indicates that the active role of the competitive driving force of competition is crucial to its ability to induce innovation, cost minimization, and improving quality. Hence he finds "not only that the ordinary usage of the term competition is not well reflected in the traditional economic paradigm of 'perfect competition' but that the traditional perfect competition model may give us only limited insights into the roles that competition plays." p. 115

And so much more!!

As a side note, he also speaks on such interesting topics as short term incentives when firm managers care about short run stock market valuation (p. 96); rent-seeking to get around patents (p. 129), and lots else not so directly related to comparative systems.

Austrians should look to Stiglitz for good insight, especially, I think, when he looks at socialism.

Bureaucrats and Diapers

Recently, I came across this article. I laughed - it was funny. But, I kept thinking about it. It is really an important example of why regulations are dangerous. In this particular case the government just "promoted" the use of cloth diapers, they did not regulate disposable diapers, as far as I know, nor certainly ban them. But, the story illustrates why it is so good that they did not take that step.

It was lucky that they were able to discover their mistaken assumption - that in fact in order for cloth diapers to produce as little a carbon footprint as disposable diapers they must be washed at a moderate temperature and line dried. Typical use of cloth diapers produces a larger carbon footprint than typical use of disposables. If government had taken the "moral and responsible" step that many activists advocated and either banned, regulated or highly taxed the disposable diapers: it would have led to a larger carbon footprint.

The truth came out in this study - the truth about the carbon footprint. But even what this "carbon footprint" means is not entirely clear. We think we know what greenhouses gases do, which are the worst, what is the right way to combat them according to environmental science, etc. But the "truth" we know today is different from the truth we knew 10 or 20 years ago. New studies poke holes every year in things we thought we knew, or produce new information that changes what we think we know today.

Science is a constant evolutionary process. We are always learning. The market too is a constant evolutionary process, always evolving and innovating. The market immediately begins to adapt to every new piece of information, new signal about resources, and new evolving preferences. Fighting to better serve customers, firms make products more efficient - less wasteful. If consumers care about the environment then firms will respond with products with a small footprint. Even if consumers don't care about that, more efficient product innovations may reduce the footprint anyway.

But government commands are not an evolutionary process, they are an intervention into the evolutionary process which diverts resources along another path, interrupting the flow of information, blinding the actors involved in the learning process. Government itself has the wrong incentive structure. Fighting for their own self-interest but in a bureaucracy instead of a competing firm, government officials use rent-seeking to expand their power in the market instead of improving a product to sell to customers.

Anyway, I wrote this to the EPA:

It is noble to want to prevent disaster. Government is clearly trying to pursue a goal - less global warming. But, particularly when scientists cannot come to complete agreement on exactly how different technologies affect this goal, it is extremely dangerous to pursue the end through stringent government regulations that reduce personal and economic freedoms.

Government agencies can often become over-zealous in pursuing their goals, and may do much more harm than good. Recently, after promoting the "green" solution of reusable diapers for years, the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) in the UK did a study and discovered that, unless an "extreme" approach was taken to laundering, in fact disposable diapers produced a smaller carbon footprint.

Thankfully disposable diapers had not been banned. However, another lesson came from that incident -- the study was hushed. Embarrassed that they had been promoting the wrong choice for so long, not wanting their so-obviously "green" solution to be blemished, the agency instructed civil servants not to publicize the conclusions.

The bill proposed here would expand the powers of our own green energy agency, but we could make the same kind of mistakes and restrict freedom unnecessarily. We could do a lot of damage in pursuit of a noble goal but with limited information and limited means. The government can only command and ban, it cannot innovate and find creative solutions. And it is often wrong, and often over-zealous.

The private sector came up with efficient disposable diapers to serve a need. Despite the noble will and immense power of the government, the government was wrong about the need to intervene and return to a more primitive replacement, and then it tried to hide its mistake. If the government takes the further step to regulate or ban the product it perceives as harmful and if government does not stumble upon the science that redeems the product, or if it refuses to turn back, the harm could be much greater.

This proposal would give the EPA far too much power to regulate and ban products which may not cause the great harm which the agency perceives. I believe the agency is acting in an over-zealous manner and must be restrained.

Not that I expect self-restraint from bureaucrats. This will have to be decided in the Supreme Court (again) as usual.

Planning Insights from a Non-Austrian

An interesting article in the QJE from 1964 offers some nice non-Austrian insights into the problems of central planning, by looking at problems of large organizations , be they large firms or governments, and their bureaucracy.

The first insight is in this nice paragraph, imagine yourself standing in a central statistical bureau of the government - or maybe the Fed - trying to work out how to save an ailing economy:

Statistics at the center must lose cognizance of individual psychologies, attitudes, and tendencies that are too detailed, amorphous or untactful to put into summary reports, but that can be thoroughly useful in decisions. The central staff live in the midst of aggregates, trends, averages, and over-all generalizations. They are remote from the individual reality behind the words and figures that flow and jumble over their desks. They are dealing with symbols: their input is items on paper, and their output is items on paper. The individual is expendible-- both to the American Telephone and Telegraph and to the Soviet Union.

(my emphasis)

Of course, if AT&T deals with you that way, you, hopefully, can find another phone company (so long as government hasn't given them a monopoly). The point about aggregates goes deeper than is made clear here. In particular, aggregates cannot tell you the micro-level reasons for problems with coordination and growth, and macro-level targets cannot aid individuals in the coordination necessary for growth, to reach those targets.

Another good paragraph is this one. Think of Obama's community service projects and call to the spirit of "public service". Hopefully the insight is well known, if often forgotten:

Conventional wisdom in most communities of the world approves of harnessing the "highest motives," rather than the strongest motives, to achieve social goals. Down-grading the profit motive (discussed above) is only one example. Public exhortation and praise are focused on community service, mutual help traditions, and cooperate ventures. Looking after oneself, and one's own family, earns no special applause. But economic efficiency and progress mainly depend, as Alfred Marshall advises us, on making effective use of the strongest, and not necessarily the highest, motives of mankind.

He then cites Khrushchev who tried to invoke Lenin, when he realized the need for profit motive, and stressed to the people "the exceptional importance of the Leninist principle of material incentives," explaining that "It is completely erroneous to oppose material stimuli to moral ones, material incentives to ideological-education work..." -- Indeed, Adam Smith couldn't have said it better.

The two points come together when the author then goes on to discuss corruption. The author makes the important point that planners can only make decrees, they cannot set up institutions that allow the actors to fulfill the goals by following their own strongest motives. If they did the latter, they would not be planning, but providing an environment for free choice -- a market. Instead the planner must use command, which cannot ensure the target is met, but just direct the actions of the individuals. If the actions won't produce the desired ends of the individual, he may break the law, making the results unreliable. If he follows the law from fear, but knowing it won't achieve the ends, the plan won't be fulfilled.

To the extent a central authority relies on incentives-- income, status, etc-- to get work done, it is trying to make the public interest and private interest coincide. To the extent it relies on regulations or laws -- backed in the case of government by police, courts, and army -- it is forcing people to do, in the purported general interest, what they would otherwise not do. That is, giving incentive to avoidance, evasion and corruption.

On the point of corruption, the author also wins my heart with this footnote about how the more laws imposed, the more are broken, creating a social acceptance of violation of law:

It seems plausible to estimate that the average respectable citizen in the United States breaks at least one law a day (for example, did he come to a complete stop at the last stop sign?), whereas in 1800 it is doubtful whether his predecessor broke one law a year (did he murder or steal last year?).

Thank you-- still respectable even if I get fined for California stopping.

The new New Deal

Cross Posted at Heritage

Could the current crisis usher in a new “New Deal”, with a new brand of corporatism to replace the free market system? Certainly European leaders are arguing that case. The current economic “crisis,” may itself have been caused by bad policy. Yet, is provides a great pretext for an expansion of government.

During the 1930s, as part of the New Deal, Franklin D. Roosevelt nationalized banks, set prices, wages and work hours, and promoted public works programs to employ the unemployed. The New Deal, or the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) to be precise, was supported by many industrial leaders, some of whom had helped draft the legislation. Cartels, inflated prices and subsidies were great perks for established business, especially those that would have trouble staying ahead in a free market.

Businesses then, as now, cried to Congress about their need for a bailout, and the disaster which would be wrought by their bankruptcy. NIRA was eventually declared unconstitutional. The decision made the important point that “extraordinary conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional powers.”

Until then these laws were widely supported and considered critical to recovery from the economic crisis of the time. Yet intervention did more to cause and prolong the crisis than to aid recovery.

Although these measures were defended as being necessary during an emergency, and only temporary, many still exist today. For example the emergency farm supports created with the Agricultural Adjustment Act (AAA) have morphed into the current Farm Bill, which still pays farmers not grow food.

Like the New Deal period, we are seeing waves of nationalization, bailouts of unrelated industry, and expansion of central bank power. The nationalization of banks during the New Deal was actually smaller than what we are doing today – as a percentage of GDP it was the equivalent to about $500 billion. Today the state took shares in the largest nine banks and bailouts total well over a trillion dollars.

As John Goldberg points out, the stake that government now holds in these banks is actually greater than the stake it held in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and it is quite likely that this temporary measure might too become the regular state of affairs.

If Obama is the next president, he would like to see a return to union domination and government mediation in wages and hours. Obama also favors public works programs to employ those out of work. He has already proposed at least two kinds of programs like this: his “transitional jobs” program which hires the unemployed, and his National Infrastructure Reinvestment Bank. With the excuse of an ongoing recession, he could easily roll these into New Deal sized public works projects.

But, prior to the New Deal we had small government. Prior to this new “New Deal” we already have enormous government and massive debt. The Deal we sign today would be for European style socialism, with European style unemployment and stagnation.

Causes and Cure for the Credit Crunch

This crisis is often complicated way out of proportion to what is necessary. It is really quite simple. This article makes a nice rundown, and I will give you some basic bullet points. Then I will attempt to convince you that the best medicine is to let the market detox.

Causes

The crisis was triggered by a collapse in housing. There was first a bubble - with housing prices rising and rising and rising and everybody knew it couldn't last - and then it popped. Crash. And then - oops - it took down all related lending, since so many firms had a major portion of their lending wrapped up with mortgages. Hence, credit crisis.

Now, what could have caused the bubble and the pop? Well, before jumping right to culprits, lets remind ourselves what drives prices up and down: supply and demand. So, for prices to rise, there must be greater demand than supply (lots of bids on few houses) and for prices to crash, there must suddenly be greater supply than demand.

OK. So what could have gotten supply and demand out of whack? In normal times, if demand is high and prices rise, more suppliers will come in, prices fall again; but here the supply never caught up with demand. Why?

Supply and Demand

Several policies and programs have been put into place to encourage home ownership, but which drove a wedge between supply and demand. These include:

(1) Fannie and Freddie which ensure cheap mortgages as they buy bad loans back from places like AIG and which dominate at least half of the housing market, drove reasonable lenders out of business, and made poor lending and bad loan packaging possible by being a massive customer (read: subsidy) to places like AIG.

Demand: Much more demand by the lower income buyers, demand for bad loans by gov.
Supply: Private market crowded out by Fannie/Freddie except those making loans that gov. buys

(2) The Community Reinvestment Act which forces lenders to offer cheap loans (with quotas) and which, together with Fannie and Freddie, led government to create the securitized secondary mortgage market, and which also drove potentially profitable lenders out of business, expanding Fannie and Freddie's dominance.

Demand: Much more demand by the lower income buyers, demand for bad loans by gov.
Supply: Private market crowded out again, only the few big ones can meet gov. quotas

(3) Fed-induced low interest rates which made mortgages more affordable, tax write offs and personal tax credits for mortgages, etc.

Demand: Much more demand by all buyers
Supply: Supply contingent on interest rates staying low, otherwise defaults


Now, what was the point of Fannie and Freddie? Their charter states that it is to ensure loans to those who cannot normally afford them by buying low-income private loans up on a secondary market. This is not a recipe for profit maximization, it is a recipe for excessive risk. Now, it is non-profit insurance - risk sharing - in theory. If that could work.

But it can't for several reasons. Moral hazard and plain old demand will go up, when rates are this low, so losses grow. Government has actually fed the demand of low income buyers, not only by offering them cheap housing but also by driving interest rates down, offering tax credits, etc. In fact, they kept expanding and expanding further into low-income and sub-prime lending, in the dream of reaching 70% home ownership.

Meanwhile those who would offer low-income loans at rates which would allow profit are all crowded out of the market. The only ones left who can make a profit are those who depend on Fannie and Freddie to buy their risky loan packages. So long as Fannie and Freddie stay in business, they are OK. But Fannie and Freddie can only appear as if they are above water so long as housing prices keep rising, so long as fuel keeps going on the fire of demand.

But they are going deeper and deeper and crowding out everything around them. They are swollen with risk and poised right in the center of the credit market, waiting to explode.

Why did it all come a head now? Because:

Between 2005 and 2008, Fannie purchased or guaranteed at least $270 billion in loans to risky borrowers — more than three times as much as in all its earlier years combined, according to company filings and industry data.

Boom.


Cure

I keep stressing that we understand what caused the problem. The reason for this is that (as the first link above mentions) the cure that we are putting in place is actually more of the same-- more of what caused the crisis. If the crisis was caused and fueled by these policies, why do we expect them now to save us?

Fannie and Freddie caused the crisis by not pursuing profitable business strategies - by risky lending and loss-making pricing - and yet, Paulson promises that to cure our ails he will make sure that Fannie and Freddie stop worrying about being profitable. Put the homeowner first.

Fannie and Freddie caused the crisis by expanding into the sub-prime market, the answer to foreclosures a year ago? Expand Fannie and Freddie's mandate for low-income lending. Today? More of the same.

Fannie and Freddie caused the crisis by subsidizing a risky secondary market for mortgage-back securities. Our initial response a year ago? Buy more bad loans. Our current plan? Buy more mortgage backed securities (bad loans).

The fed fueled the fire with easy money. Answer? Easy money.

This is classing government intervention feeding on itself.

What is the right cure? Leave it be. Let the market restructure. Don't feed the crisis. If you think it will hurt, you may be right. But won't $700 billion in transfer from taxpayer to government also hurt? Won't feeding the loss-making machinery of socialized companies, which will need to be bailed out again and again hurt? Won't subsidizing failing companies which drive out regular business hurt too?

There is no pain-free answer. But there are cures that hurt because they detoxify, and there are cures that feel good right now, like a mamosa over breakfast after a drinking binge, but fail to actually solve the problem. In fact, they make it worse. And the final detox hurts more.

This crisis, the more I learn of it, the more it reminds me of the transition in Russia. We have to cut the strings. We are being made a muppet.

Bailouts Making the Crisis Worse?

Economic policies often have unintended consequences. While the decentralized actions of individuals in the market can effectively coordinate the supply of goods – Adam Smith’s invisible hand – centralized government actions cannot. So, when market crises come about, it is important to ask certain questions before looking to government to correct the failure.

First, was it a failure of decentralized actors? Was a market failure, or irrational speculation, at the root of the problem, or was it government intervention that caused it? The financial markets have not been free of regulation, and they have been bailed out before. Those companies most regulated were the ones that led the crisis. Similarly, in countries with even more regulated and state owned financial sectors, the crisis has taken down those nationalized firms.

If it was intervention that caused the problem, then there may be no need to tie the hands of the market to prevent future crises. Instead we could roll back the interventionist policies we’ve been using, potentially allowing firms more flexibility to solve market failures on their own. Even the most benign regulation might prevent the market from innovating, adapting and spurring growth. Literally throwing money at the problem, and then seizing companies at will, cannot solve the underlying problems.

Second, it is important to ask both what would happen without bailouts and what is likely to happen with them. Many commentators simply consider the first, and have a doomsday scenario, but they have not considered carefully how the bailing out itself might cause both short term, and of course long term, damage. In the short term some say that the bailouts “are actually making it harder for financial firms to raise the money they need to muddle through the credit crunch.”

Further intervention is likely to make it worse if intervention caused the crisis in the first place. In the long run you have serious moral hazard problems – this is well known. Trying to dodge some of these problems, the Fed is being inconsistent in its bail out policy. Playing favorites is a well loved perk of discretionary policy making because it allows for rent-seeking by firms and politicians. With bail outs and subsidies, bad firms and bad investments are propped up like petty dictators, serving themselves but not the people. All this waste is laid at the foot of the tax-payer.

Finally, if we create a crisis through use of intervention and then respond to the crisis with more intervention, which in turn makes the crisis worse, and then respond to that crisis with yet more intervention – when will it ever stop?

As CNN reports, “This is the federal government's most far-reaching intervention in the financial markets since the Great Depression of the 1930s.” It will cost hundreds of billions now, and much more later, if it causes more crises down the road. So, it is critical that we ask: do we need these bail outs, and what are we setting ourselves up for?

Socialism Not Speculation to Blame for High Oil Prices

More than 75% of the world’s oil reserves are controlled by national oil companies. Of the world’s top 20 oil-producing firms, 14 are state-run. Those areas where private companies have been able to drill have recently been shrinking, and remaining private companies are facing hostile governments that may try to nationalize them.

Meanwhile, Congress, pandering to the least economically sound sentiments of the American public, recently tried to pass a bill to curb oil market speculation. This, lawmakers argued, was the way to get prices down. Speculation is just trading on the future price of a good. There have been many reasons to expect the price of oil to continue to rise. Along with rising demand, and subsidies to aid the rise in demand, there is a lot of risk. Risk causes volatility and drives prices up — at least in the short term.

There is risk because of the war in Iraq, because of the government in Iran, terrorism, and then there is additional risk because of the growing number of countries where the governments are trying to nationalize the oil supply.

This typically starts with the government harassing private oil companies. Clearly that makes owning stocks in those companies risky as owners will lose their investment. This can also fuel volatility in the futures markets as investors try to predict the likelihood of nationalization. If those companies get taken over or forced out, the total supply of oil may fall and so the future price will be higher.

This has been going on for a few years now. And the trend continues to worsen. Russia’s Vladimir Putin jailed the ex-chief of Yukos oil company so that it could be taken over by state-owned Rosneft in 2004. And today in Moscow, British Petrol is being hassled and taken to court.

In 2003 Hugo Chavez took the reigns of Petroleos de Venezuela in a “re-nationalization” move, and now Ecuador is taking Chevron to court. This little move by Ecuador could be the start of something bigger, as it looks like Ecuador might join forces with Chavez’s state-run venture, which might in turn join forces with Russia’s.

Bolivia also nationalized in 2006. Soon there will be nowhere left outside of Western Europe and the U.S. where private oil can safely drill.

Another reason that nationalization can drive prices up is that state-owned companies tend to under-produce private ones, creating additional risk that long-term output will be lower. Finally, consolidation of oil companies into just a few nationalized firms, especially when those countries form cartels rather than competing freely on the market, will also drive up prices. This trend in nationalization is simply an extension of the existing problems of OPEC. It should be obvious that this trend is contributing to the high oil prices.

But rather than see the reasons for the rise in prices — the real risks which face the oil market — Congress tries to strangle speculation, prevent new drilling, and it even flirts with idea of nationalizing our own supply. Reps. Maurice Hinchey (D-N.Y.) and Maxine Waters (D-Calif.) both recently suggested it, and a recent poll shows many Democrats(and even a few Republicans) think it’s a good idea. But nationalizing is the problem, not the answer.

cross-posted at Heritage.

Rent-Seeking and The Housing Crisis

Recently, a scandal has broken out that provides great insight into the housing crisis. Countrywide Mortgage brokers have been treating Congress to VIP lending rates. Accepting donations of $100 or more is illegal for these politicians, but scandals like this are not uncommon. The deeper question is why a profit-seeking business like Countrywide would want to offer discount rates to government officials in the first place. It is, of course, because they expect something in return.

If government could not offer these businesses any preferential legislation, exemptions from taxes or relief from anti-business regulations, there would be no incentive to buy them off.

Economists call this kind of activity rent-seeking. When firms spend money – or decrease their profit – in order to ensure favorable treatment by government it is not efficient. They produce no more output, and instead the resources are wasted. The favorable treatment gives them a monopoly position or an advantage over their competitors and the consumer suffers.

It also encourages government officials to pass more kinds of regulations that strangle business so that there are more chances to offer relief in exchange for pay-offs from the businesses. So, it creates a feedback loop leading to more regulations, more bribes and then even more regulation.

The only way to end the cycle is to limit the scope of government with a clear line preventing government from offering any kind of preferential treatment to firms.

But rather than moving toward a smaller scope of government, we are currently headed in the opposite direction. The new housing bill is set to bail out firms on a preferential basis – often by helping those, like Countrywide, who made the most risky sub-prime loans. In the future, these businesses will remember the compassion of Congress and will take these risks again.

Local governments will benefit too – with $3.9 billion in community development block grants. These grants are provided so that local governments can purchase, renovate and resell foreclosed homes. The proceeds can then be used to do this again next time that government subsidies followed by government bailouts lead to a new round of foreclosures. In this way, government can cause a crisis, solve it, and cause a new one, little by little expanding its scope in the process.

Have we not learned the lessons of the National Recovery Administration, when subsidies and bailouts, public works programs, and stringent regulations led us to a consolidation of government and big business that strangled private initiative and threatened the liberties we hold dear? Apparently we have not – a recent Time Magazine poll showed that 82% favor public works projects and 70% say more government programs are needed for those struggling.

The more that we allow government to solve our economic woes, the more that it expands its scope and creates new woes, just to have something more to solve. This is the rent-seeking power of government at its most frightening.

Cross-posted at the Heritage blog.

Note that the Center for American Progress was very enthusiastic about the community development block grants - HT Econlog for that.

Understanding Monopoly Socialism

Lenin (1917), in complete agreement with Marx, and with the true meaning of socialism, lays out the economic and organizational identity between state-capitalism and socialism. The only difference - which isn't one - is the "class" of the leaders of the system. But, of course, as leaders running the system, either one belongs to the "class" called bureaucrat. Hence, Lenin laid out the answer to Bukharin's Leviathan problem (see below).

Everybody talks about imperialism. But imperialism is merely monopoly capitalism.

...And what is the state? It is an organisation of the ruling class ...

For if a huge capitalist undertaking becomes a monopoly, it means that it serves the whole nation. If it has become a state monopoly, it means that the state (i.e., the armed organisation of the population, the workers and peasants above all, provided there is revolutionary democracy) directs the whole undertaking. In whose interest?

Either in the interest of the landowners and capitalists, in which case we have not a revolutionary-democratic, but a reactionary-bureaucratic state, an imperialist republic.

Or in the interest of revolutionary democracy—and then it is a step towards socialism.

For socialism is merely the next step forward from state-capitalist monopoly. Or, in other words, socialism is merely state-capitalist monopoly which is made to serve the interests of the whole people and has to that extent ceased to be capitalist monopoly.

Bukharin, of course, expressed disgust that state-capitalism was the most evil administrative totalitarianism to crawl the wretched Earth. In Imperialism and the World Economy (1915) he wrote:

Thus arises the final type of the contemporary imperialist robber state, an iron organization which envelops the living body of society in its tenacious, grasping paws. It is a New Leviathan, before which the fantasy of Thomas Hobbes seems child's play. And even more “non est potestas super terram quae compateur ei” (“there is no power on earth that can compare with it”).

Bukharin was, of course, right.

Bukharin did consider that a planned a totalitarian society could exist which was not socialism (as conceived by Marx), he pondered a possible "third system"; but he could not see that in fact it was socialism - that the only difference between central planning as socialism, and central planning as this "third system", was a change in human nature which would allow the people to enjoy this slavery.

He described this "third system" in the same 1915 book:

We would have an entirely new economic form. This would be capitalism no more, for the production of commodities would have disappeared; still less would it be socialism, for the power of one class over the other would have remained (and even grown stronger). Such an economic structure would, most of all, resemble a slaveowning economy where the slave market is absent. (italics in original)

However, the flaw in Bukharin's reasoning is that he is considering a non-economic effect (the domination of one class over another) as part of the definition of an economic system. Instead, an economic analysis must consider just the economic organization of the system - its institutions and their effects - and from there determine the expected outcome: whether it will resemble a slaveowning economy without a slave market.

From this standpoint, there is no basis on which to distinguish the "third system" from socialism. Indeed, it has no commodities - no trade, no market, no prices - so it isn't capitalism. Instead, it has central planning. This is the same as socialism. The only differences from socialism which Bukharin observes are that (1) one class may still dominate another and (2) that this class may not serve the needs of the people. But these two are potential results of the economic structure, not part of the structure itself.

The steps that socialists believed would prevent the outcome described above include a change in human nature on the part of the people, and the motives of the working class, who were to take the reigns of their new society. But their new society, they knew, would need to help change the nature of the people, and the structure must also allow the working class to achieve their good intentions. As any good economist knows, intention is not result.

If the economic structure is identical, why would this "third system" not also produce the desired change in human nature? The distinction is only in the "class" which has the reigns. But, this implies that the intention of the class will be accomplished through this structure. It must then be proven that this economic structure will indeed allow the working class to accomplish its goals and that these goals not only exist at the start but also remain, even as they take on the "class" of bureaucrat.

Socialists asserted that the economic structure - planning - would create a society of abundance. But this assertion was tied in to the "socialist" nature of their system - that the working class ruled it. Hence, Bukharin could not show that planning itself would produce enough plenty to allow the working class to accomplish their goals. In fact, Marxists relied primarily on their argument of inevitability to show this result. But the economic organization itself can only promise the need to direct the actions of the people, the result of abundance does not directly follow from the collective ownership of the means of production, and the "rationality" of the planned system.

If it could be shown that (a) the planned system will lead to higher output and that (b) the requirements for planning efficiently still allow for the egalitarian distribution required for the fulfillment of the socialist ideal, then it would only remain to show that the desire of the planners would remain benevolent, and the nature of the citizens would be such that the planned system would not feel oppressive (or that the system would allow for democracy, a much harder case). But Marxists proved none of these.

Bukharin also broached the subject as late as 1928 - just before Stalin helped to bring a fully socialist planned economy to the Soviet Union (and Bukharin at this point was losing his hold on the reigns of the system). He explained how it might look:

Here a planned economy exists, organized distribution not only in relation to the links and interrelationship between the various branches of production, but also in relation to consumption. The slave in this society receives his share of provisions, of goods constituting the product of the general labor. He may receive very little, but all the same there will be no crises.

The crises referred to are, of course, the crises Bukharin believed to be inevitable under capitalism. Again, he sees that economically the organization is identical. He is one step away from seeing that this is in fact the system he has been advocating and putting into place in Russia. What is he missing?

He is missing the fact that this economic system does not allow for any other outcome. The "very little" product that the "slave" receives is, of course, all there will be. The bureaucrats in power not only will not, but cannot, give the people any more. Despite the best of intentions which they may or may not have, they can do no more than act as slave masters. They are forced to direct the actions of individuals. They cannot change human nature. They cannot wave a magic wand and effect the higher output, the perfect order, or the master plan which they may desire.

The planned economy - the institutional organization of the economy - determines the outcome. The best intentions of the best people in the highest leadership positions cannot turn a slave economy into a socialist paradise, just because they wish it so.

Planning Every Home

Here is a perfect example of the planning mentality driven by the need for order.

Arstechnica rails "We're in dire need of a national broadband strategy" because we have less broadband than other countries. Seeing something perceived to be a problem, the immediate conclusion is that government must fix it. Clearly, if the US is falling behind other countries in some area which the author deems important, then the US government must intervene on its behalf and both determine what is "wrong" and also "fix it."

Arstechnica links to further explanation of the right "strategy" and how our current one is wrong. They complain that the government "strategy" relies too much on the free market. The government says that intervention will distort the market and Arstechnica replies :

Is it too much to ask for some sort of vision? Some sort of leadership? Something along the lines of "a chicken in every pot and fiber to every home by 2012"?

Yes, its too much to ask. The assumption is that government must determine what the "right amount" of broadband is. Further, the assumption is that government should set the goal, determine whether it is being met and why, and finally take action to reach that goal. But, my dears, that is planning. It is a planning mindset, and leads to planning of the economy.

Just as you don't want government to ensure that chickens are raised and killed and delivered to your door, based on some fallacious notion that it is government's job to put "a chicken in every pot," neither should we expect government to ensure that we have broadband in every town or fiber in every home.

It is actually conceivable that we have the right amount of broadband right now. This may not be a "market failure." In fact, we could probably never determine whether there is some kind of failure here - be it caused within the market or by government. We can't know the "right amount" of broadband. But, also, here is the kicker:

I have lived in rural New Mexico. I know the facts. You can get satellite internet in the furthest reaches of the most absurd nooks and crannies of the four corners states and across the most ridiculous expanses of desert - for cheap. For much less than the median rural New Mexico household spends on other luxury items. If they want it, they can get it. This is true across the country - either satellite or cable or DSL is offered everywhere (the map shown by Arstechnica confirms this; nearly every spot on it has some kind of broadband, just apparently not as much as they have in Australia).

If demand is low, then fewer services are offered. In other words, if they don't want it, they don't get it. So it isn't there. If they do want it, guess what, someone offers it. If they want it, they can get it.

If they want it, they can get it.

One more time: we don't need government to spoon feed us.

The New Farm Bill: Agricultural Planning

In explaining consumer sovereignty, Mises said:

Neither the entrepreneurs nor the farmers nor the capitalists determine what has to be produced. The consumers do that.

And this is accurate - in a free market. However, the Farm Bill has effectively put an end to that truth, in the United States. Passing with a veto-proof majority, the new farm bill expands subsidies further, and gives yet more power of direction to farmers and corporations; and their legislative managers.

Originally enacted (under other names, such as the AAA) the farm bill was a central planning program to control agricultural prices and support employment and wages. Over the past 75 years it has changed its mission, but it is still used for planning purposes.

Today, senators reel off speeches about the importance of directing funds toward "sustainable" energy, ensuring low food prices, and feeding the poor. Meanwhile, they don't mind that their interest groups and constituents reward them with votes for the generous subsidies. While congress no longer attempts to restrict production by commanding the farmers to kill their pigs, they still set quotas and control prices.

Is it possible to get congress to abandon this massive central planning program? There is such a loud and broad constituency for it (farmers including big business, low income and welfare advocates, environmentalists, and those who just like government regulation) that it seems unlikely. However, congress does respond to the voter. Let him not be irrational.

Update - Washington Watch says:

H.R. 2419
The Farm Bill Extension Act of 2007
Costs $5,727.56 per family