If You Can't Explain It, It Probably Isn't Right

I spoke to a non-economist today about the housing crisis, credit crunch, financial crisis, bailouts and recession. She had some basic insights about supply and demand, listened and agreed with me that the policies were likely to blame (regulations pushing low-income loans, interest rates, subsidies and so on), and we agreed that expanding these policies would make it difficult for entrepreneurs to spur recovery. My explanation was consistent with - in fact was pretty much exactly - the Austrian position.

Could a Keynesian explanation and solution have been as easily explained? The person I spoke to was not predisposed toward a free market solution or a government answer. I wonder if some of the credit crunch explanations that get into all the complexities are necessary, and with their confusing intricate details and delicate cures, whether they are able to get at the essence of something so big and far-reaching.

Of course, some simple explanations - especially ones that blame some minority group - are a distraction, scapegoat. So, perhaps if the explanation is complicated, it is unlikely to be right, but if it is simple it could be right or wrong. Then it just comes down to common sense. Since anyone is able to understand it, it comes down to being rational and honest in examining the logic. What do you think?

Causes and Cure for the Credit Crunch

This crisis is often complicated way out of proportion to what is necessary. It is really quite simple. This article makes a nice rundown, and I will give you some basic bullet points. Then I will attempt to convince you that the best medicine is to let the market detox.

Causes

The crisis was triggered by a collapse in housing. There was first a bubble - with housing prices rising and rising and rising and everybody knew it couldn't last - and then it popped. Crash. And then - oops - it took down all related lending, since so many firms had a major portion of their lending wrapped up with mortgages. Hence, credit crisis.

Now, what could have caused the bubble and the pop? Well, before jumping right to culprits, lets remind ourselves what drives prices up and down: supply and demand. So, for prices to rise, there must be greater demand than supply (lots of bids on few houses) and for prices to crash, there must suddenly be greater supply than demand.

OK. So what could have gotten supply and demand out of whack? In normal times, if demand is high and prices rise, more suppliers will come in, prices fall again; but here the supply never caught up with demand. Why?

Supply and Demand

Several policies and programs have been put into place to encourage home ownership, but which drove a wedge between supply and demand. These include:

(1) Fannie and Freddie which ensure cheap mortgages as they buy bad loans back from places like AIG and which dominate at least half of the housing market, drove reasonable lenders out of business, and made poor lending and bad loan packaging possible by being a massive customer (read: subsidy) to places like AIG.

Demand: Much more demand by the lower income buyers, demand for bad loans by gov.
Supply: Private market crowded out by Fannie/Freddie except those making loans that gov. buys

(2) The Community Reinvestment Act which forces lenders to offer cheap loans (with quotas) and which, together with Fannie and Freddie, led government to create the securitized secondary mortgage market, and which also drove potentially profitable lenders out of business, expanding Fannie and Freddie's dominance.

Demand: Much more demand by the lower income buyers, demand for bad loans by gov.
Supply: Private market crowded out again, only the few big ones can meet gov. quotas

(3) Fed-induced low interest rates which made mortgages more affordable, tax write offs and personal tax credits for mortgages, etc.

Demand: Much more demand by all buyers
Supply: Supply contingent on interest rates staying low, otherwise defaults


Now, what was the point of Fannie and Freddie? Their charter states that it is to ensure loans to those who cannot normally afford them by buying low-income private loans up on a secondary market. This is not a recipe for profit maximization, it is a recipe for excessive risk. Now, it is non-profit insurance - risk sharing - in theory. If that could work.

But it can't for several reasons. Moral hazard and plain old demand will go up, when rates are this low, so losses grow. Government has actually fed the demand of low income buyers, not only by offering them cheap housing but also by driving interest rates down, offering tax credits, etc. In fact, they kept expanding and expanding further into low-income and sub-prime lending, in the dream of reaching 70% home ownership.

Meanwhile those who would offer low-income loans at rates which would allow profit are all crowded out of the market. The only ones left who can make a profit are those who depend on Fannie and Freddie to buy their risky loan packages. So long as Fannie and Freddie stay in business, they are OK. But Fannie and Freddie can only appear as if they are above water so long as housing prices keep rising, so long as fuel keeps going on the fire of demand.

But they are going deeper and deeper and crowding out everything around them. They are swollen with risk and poised right in the center of the credit market, waiting to explode.

Why did it all come a head now? Because:

Between 2005 and 2008, Fannie purchased or guaranteed at least $270 billion in loans to risky borrowers — more than three times as much as in all its earlier years combined, according to company filings and industry data.

Boom.


Cure

I keep stressing that we understand what caused the problem. The reason for this is that (as the first link above mentions) the cure that we are putting in place is actually more of the same-- more of what caused the crisis. If the crisis was caused and fueled by these policies, why do we expect them now to save us?

Fannie and Freddie caused the crisis by not pursuing profitable business strategies - by risky lending and loss-making pricing - and yet, Paulson promises that to cure our ails he will make sure that Fannie and Freddie stop worrying about being profitable. Put the homeowner first.

Fannie and Freddie caused the crisis by expanding into the sub-prime market, the answer to foreclosures a year ago? Expand Fannie and Freddie's mandate for low-income lending. Today? More of the same.

Fannie and Freddie caused the crisis by subsidizing a risky secondary market for mortgage-back securities. Our initial response a year ago? Buy more bad loans. Our current plan? Buy more mortgage backed securities (bad loans).

The fed fueled the fire with easy money. Answer? Easy money.

This is classing government intervention feeding on itself.

What is the right cure? Leave it be. Let the market restructure. Don't feed the crisis. If you think it will hurt, you may be right. But won't $700 billion in transfer from taxpayer to government also hurt? Won't feeding the loss-making machinery of socialized companies, which will need to be bailed out again and again hurt? Won't subsidizing failing companies which drive out regular business hurt too?

There is no pain-free answer. But there are cures that hurt because they detoxify, and there are cures that feel good right now, like a mamosa over breakfast after a drinking binge, but fail to actually solve the problem. In fact, they make it worse. And the final detox hurts more.

This crisis, the more I learn of it, the more it reminds me of the transition in Russia. We have to cut the strings. We are being made a muppet.

Mortgage Socialization

Cross-posted at Heritage.

Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were created during the New Deal by the Roosevelt administration in order increase home ownership. With government backing and price controls, the supply of housing was artificially increased, with the funds coming from the taxpayer.

Even when Fannie and Freddie were made into government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in the 1960s, they were still provided the financial support of the Federal Government. Because of their implicit government guarantees, these policy-based suppliers came to dominate the housing market.

As GSEs, Fannie and Freddie purchased 44% of subprime mortgage securities and were the biggest buyer of Countrywide loans. They became an industry duopoly, owning or guaranteeing about half the $12 trillion mortgage market. Risk was socialized, spread across all taxpayers through government guarantee, while profit was concentrated and private. This is a prototype case of government thriving on “concentrated benefits and dispersed costs.”

The ability to do this is what drives government expansion, taking from the masses and channeling the money to a minority – or special – interest. With these special interests, campaigns were launched, politicians entrenched and bureaucracy expanded. Hence Fannie and Freddie represent a massive rent seeking operation, to funnel money into the hands of officials at the expense of the taxpayer.

And yet none of this was sustainable, because it wasn’t profitable. Inevitably there would be collapse. Fannie and Freddie engaged in Enron-style accounting, and mafia-like corporatist tactics. It was their privileged status that led to the corruption, and that distorted the housing market and helped to inflate the housing bubble (also made possible by loose monetary policy).

The government takeover only makes all of these things worse. In the short run there is relief that a market collapse won’t occur imminently, but like the Soviet Union during perestroika, the fear of pain during reform can only lead to the delay of collapse and a more painful landing. Further concentration can only cause further waste, as competition, profit guidance and valuable price signals give way to bureaucracy, rent-seeking, inflation and misdirected investment.

As nationalized firms, Fannie and Freddie are government agencies, relying entirely on public funding. They have no reason to keep costs low, and every reason to allow short-term political objectives to guide their choices instead. Indeed, the Treasury has made it very clear that they will specifically move away from profit guidance. Treasury secretary Paulson said on Sunday that the entities “will no longer be managed with a strategy to maximize common shareholder returns.”

Paulson has promised that the fees they charge banks for loan securitization services will be examined “with an eye toward mortgage affordability,” even as they are neck deep in bankruptcy. This reminds me, again, of the logic of perestroika – instead of freeing prices up and allowing some market adjustment, so that the economy could finally get on track, a compromise was made. Prices would be “based on social costs,” companies were allowed to “take into consideration cost-effectiveness” but “speculative price increases aimed at excessive profit” were forbidden.

The logic of the expanding U.S. government is becoming just as warped. The socialization of risk caused the housing crisis, and the response is to nationalize. Risky lending driven by policy not profit caused the collapse and the “reforms” will reduce fees and shun profitability. If we keep moving in this direction, we’ll pass through our own reverse perestroika, and end up a socialist state.

Rent-Seeking and The Housing Crisis

Recently, a scandal has broken out that provides great insight into the housing crisis. Countrywide Mortgage brokers have been treating Congress to VIP lending rates. Accepting donations of $100 or more is illegal for these politicians, but scandals like this are not uncommon. The deeper question is why a profit-seeking business like Countrywide would want to offer discount rates to government officials in the first place. It is, of course, because they expect something in return.

If government could not offer these businesses any preferential legislation, exemptions from taxes or relief from anti-business regulations, there would be no incentive to buy them off.

Economists call this kind of activity rent-seeking. When firms spend money – or decrease their profit – in order to ensure favorable treatment by government it is not efficient. They produce no more output, and instead the resources are wasted. The favorable treatment gives them a monopoly position or an advantage over their competitors and the consumer suffers.

It also encourages government officials to pass more kinds of regulations that strangle business so that there are more chances to offer relief in exchange for pay-offs from the businesses. So, it creates a feedback loop leading to more regulations, more bribes and then even more regulation.

The only way to end the cycle is to limit the scope of government with a clear line preventing government from offering any kind of preferential treatment to firms.

But rather than moving toward a smaller scope of government, we are currently headed in the opposite direction. The new housing bill is set to bail out firms on a preferential basis – often by helping those, like Countrywide, who made the most risky sub-prime loans. In the future, these businesses will remember the compassion of Congress and will take these risks again.

Local governments will benefit too – with $3.9 billion in community development block grants. These grants are provided so that local governments can purchase, renovate and resell foreclosed homes. The proceeds can then be used to do this again next time that government subsidies followed by government bailouts lead to a new round of foreclosures. In this way, government can cause a crisis, solve it, and cause a new one, little by little expanding its scope in the process.

Have we not learned the lessons of the National Recovery Administration, when subsidies and bailouts, public works programs, and stringent regulations led us to a consolidation of government and big business that strangled private initiative and threatened the liberties we hold dear? Apparently we have not – a recent Time Magazine poll showed that 82% favor public works projects and 70% say more government programs are needed for those struggling.

The more that we allow government to solve our economic woes, the more that it expands its scope and creates new woes, just to have something more to solve. This is the rent-seeking power of government at its most frightening.

Cross-posted at the Heritage blog.

Note that the Center for American Progress was very enthusiastic about the community development block grants - HT Econlog for that.