Mortgage Socialization
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were created during the New Deal by the Roosevelt administration in order increase home ownership. With government backing and price controls, the supply of housing was artificially increased, with the funds coming from the taxpayer.
Even when Fannie and Freddie were made into government sponsored enterprises (GSEs) in the 1960s, they were still provided the financial support of the Federal Government. Because of their implicit government guarantees, these policy-based suppliers came to dominate the housing market.
As GSEs, Fannie and Freddie purchased 44% of subprime mortgage securities and were the biggest buyer of Countrywide loans. They became an industry duopoly, owning or guaranteeing about half the $12 trillion mortgage market. Risk was socialized, spread across all taxpayers through government guarantee, while profit was concentrated and private. This is a prototype case of government thriving on “concentrated benefits and dispersed costs.”
The ability to do this is what drives government expansion, taking from the masses and channeling the money to a minority – or special – interest. With these special interests, campaigns were launched, politicians entrenched and bureaucracy expanded. Hence Fannie and Freddie represent a massive rent seeking operation, to funnel money into the hands of officials at the expense of the taxpayer.
And yet none of this was sustainable, because it wasn’t profitable. Inevitably there would be collapse. Fannie and Freddie engaged in Enron-style accounting, and mafia-like corporatist tactics. It was their privileged status that led to the corruption, and that distorted the housing market and helped to inflate the housing bubble (also made possible by loose monetary policy).
The government takeover only makes all of these things worse. In the short run there is relief that a market collapse won’t occur imminently, but like the Soviet Union during perestroika, the fear of pain during reform can only lead to the delay of collapse and a more painful landing. Further concentration can only cause further waste, as competition, profit guidance and valuable price signals give way to bureaucracy, rent-seeking, inflation and misdirected investment.
As nationalized firms, Fannie and Freddie are government agencies, relying entirely on public funding. They have no reason to keep costs low, and every reason to allow short-term political objectives to guide their choices instead. Indeed, the Treasury has made it very clear that they will specifically move away from profit guidance. Treasury secretary Paulson said on Sunday that the entities “will no longer be managed with a strategy to maximize common shareholder returns.”
Paulson has promised that the fees they charge banks for loan securitization services will be examined “with an eye toward mortgage affordability,” even as they are neck deep in bankruptcy. This reminds me, again, of the logic of perestroika – instead of freeing prices up and allowing some market adjustment, so that the economy could finally get on track, a compromise was made. Prices would be “based on social costs,” companies were allowed to “take into consideration cost-effectiveness” but “speculative price increases aimed at excessive profit” were forbidden.
The logic of the expanding U.S. government is becoming just as warped. The socialization of risk caused the housing crisis, and the response is to nationalize. Risky lending driven by policy not profit caused the collapse and the “reforms” will reduce fees and shun profitability. If we keep moving in this direction, we’ll pass through our own reverse perestroika, and end up a socialist state.
Labels: bail-outs, competition, corporatism, housing, markets, rent-seeking, small government, socialism, socialization

8 Comments:
wasn't the bail-out mostly to save the investors? and maybe arguably ultimately the economy, since it might have caused some kind of economic recession if the stockholders lost everything on FNMA?
It was a federalized system in the beginning because after the depression and during the war, no private system was going to get into such a risky business. It was just the wrong time to count on the market. The government isn't always evil.
The rationale behind the bail-out isn't really critical to my point. The effects of the bail-out are. The best of intentions need not produce, short or long term, what one hopes for, depending on the means used.
Some argue that, indeed, the bail-out is necessary right now at time t in order to prevent a massive stock market crash, and other doom and gloom. I am not so sure of this.
But, even if it is, two follow up questions remain:
1. Will the bail out actually prevent this doom and gloom long run, or only delay it (as in my perestroika example)? How will it do so - give the me the gory details of the economic theory. Keynesians have a theory, but it has largely been debunked (it was stupid to begin with). Austrians have a theory about how it only prevents the collapse, and I would argue that this was born out during perestroika, along with during the great depression, and at other times and places.
2. What will happen long run if you do a bail out now -- how will this change expectations and incentives?
In this case, with Fannie and Freddie nationalized, what are the incentives when they have no market competition and base pricing and output choices on political rather than economic criteria?
In other cases (and in this case to the extent there are other GSEs, and in this case for other related areas such as interest rates generally) how does this choice affect private firms' expectations about borrowing, risk taking and so forth -- won't government come to the rescue if something goes wrong?
Won't interest rates stay low for the long term, since the Fed wants them to? etc. All of these things are what helped to cause the crisis that you want to prevent (the loss to investors and the recession) in the first place. Hence, this is a very important consideration.
As a follow up and clarification to my reply:
The "doom and gloom" scenario is really arguing that the restructuring of the economy due to allowing firms that aren't profitable to fail, and interventions that created risk to dissolve, will be painful.
This may be true (though it may not be as bad as what is argued) but it would also allow the economy to restructure - to let actually profitable firms rise, while inefficient ones die. In the longer run, this will bring more growth.
On the other hand, preventing this from occurring may mean less pain in the short run, but it drags on the bad practices which brought us to the verge of collapse. And in fact it means entrenching these very same practices and giving them more power.
This both (1) delays the restructuring and (2) increases the dangerous practices which led to the crisis.
The only two reactions will always remain: restructure or entrench.
The "delay" idea is that we will eventually have to restructure.
If we never have to restructure then we must always keep entrenching, keep centralizing. This is the "road to serfdom" where we must always keep increasing government power in order to "save" the economy. This may prevent collapse for an "indefinite" period, but at the expense of our economy -- ultimately to the stagnant bureaucracy of socialism.
ok, so you would support going through the depression to whatever extent it would be necessary - but if you were bush, that might cost the election...
but if it were at the beginning of your presidency, you would choose to go through an economic depression in order to restructure the economy? Did it work in the 30s? weren't most investors too scared to invest? doesn't a lot of money go overseas? or people buy short stocks etc? isn't it often not until the gov't makes some decisions that things get restructured at all?
hm, i thought i posted another comment. must've gotten lost, sorry...
yeah, well, I think everyone agrees it's kind of a mess. Maybe there's an economic advisor who could have supplied a theory that could have been implemented over the long term and somehow allowed for a slow-motion privatization that wouldn't have been too risky or something. I don't know enough about it, obviously. But no one is celebrating this as a great solution, just as necessary to prevent a severe collapse of some sort.
You could say this was a problem, that we don't do anything about things until the last minute, but then you're almost saying the trouble is we don't live in a planned economy!
Sorry if a comment got lost!
To answer your questions:
ok, so you would support going through the depression to whatever extent it would be necessary
Yes.
- but if you were bush, that might cost the election...
Exactly!! That is the politics of democracy, and exactly (one reason) why we see what we see: short term political choices, rather than good economics.
but if it were at the beginning of your presidency, you would choose to go through an economic depression in order to restructure the economy?
Perhaps some would, but its risky politically, and there are other advantages to doing it the "easy" way -- the short term advantages of "doing something" for interest groups and voters are visible, while the losses for allowing the longer term stagnation can often be hidden.
Did it work in the 30s?
The 1930s is an example of the opposite: FDR stepped in with lots and lots of interventions, bail-outs, subsidies, etc. (Even Hoover ramped up intervention.)
That is why the depression lasted so long: the restructuring was delayed, and more and more interventions stagnated the economy. Much of it was hidden by inflationary monetary policy (people didn't see how much of their real incomes were redistributed to government, the statistics showed growth when there was none). It finally took until after WWII to get the economy back on track (with greater labor force participation by women and a cutting back of many of the worst interventions in 1948).
weren't most investors too scared to invest? doesn't a lot of money go overseas? or people buy short stocks etc? isn't it often not until the gov't makes some decisions that things get restructured at all?
Investors will be scared to invest at first, during the restructuring, but prices fall until the risk is worth it for some.
Money "going overseas" is a confusion, free trade actually helps to lift the economy back up - as products are bought overseas that can't be bought here, which helps consumption and investment here, and buying overseas encourages the investment here of overseas firms, which again, helps us here.
And, no, I don't think government helps the restructuring process -- the policies do the reverse, they prevent it.
I don't really understand the logic in your other post. Arguing for "shock therapy" privatization is not arguing for a planned economy. Its arguing for a quick return to a free economy.
Yes, perhaps the freeing up of an economy takes planning - you can laugh about that paradox perhaps - but it isn't saying that we should plan the economy, only that we should plan the disentangling of ourselves from planning.
Once you are in a planned economy (or one with large sections of planning) it does take work to get out.
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